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A Review of Poetry and Uselessness:
From Coleridge to Ashbery,
by Robert Archambeau
Robert Archambeau, Poetry and Uselessness: From Coleridge to Ashbery (New
York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2020), pp. 244, ISBN: 978-0-367-20736-6
(hardcover); ISBN: 978-0-429-26317-0 (eBook).

Reviewed by Ben Grant

I

’m going to begin this review with a bit of a gripe, I’m afraid. I was asked
to undertake it, and enthusiastically accepted the invitation, because of
my interest in the subject of uselessness. Needless to say, for me a book
entitled Poetry and Uselessness looked like a dream come true. My eBook
received, I started reading it at once, and as soon as I did so, I had a sinking
feeling. No mention of uselessness in the first few paragraphs, but plenty on
“aesthetic autonomy”—not the same thing at all. I decided to search the text
for the word “uselessness,” and found to my dismay that it occurs only three
times—once in the title, once on the series page, and once on the title page. The
knowledge that the word does not appear at all in the main text did, though,
afford me a novel reading experience, no small thing for as hardened a reader
as myself—henceforth, every time I read the phrase “aesthetic autonomy” in
the introduction, its effect upon me bore a striking resemblance to a slap on the
face. That said, I can see that there is a relationship between aesthetic autonomy
and uselessness, so I will try to explore that through my reading of the book.
In entitling a book about poetry and aesthetic autonomy Poetry and
Uselessness, Archambeau implies that uselessness and aesthetic autonomy
are synonymous. His central thesis is that the idea of aesthetic autonomy has
been put to a variety of uses by the poets he considers (Coleridge, Tennyson,
Yeats, Stein, Eliot, Auden, and John Ashbery), so equating aesthetic autonomy
with uselessness then makes for a neat argument: the idea of the uselessness
of poetry has, in fact, proven to be an eminently useful one. This is something
of a straw man argument, though, for the real focal point of Archambeau’s
book is not the debate between uselessness and usefulness, but that between
a conception of poetry as autonomous from the social and political realm,
and a conception of it as socially engaged, or politically committed. Within
this debate, the dominant position of those who argue for the autonomy of
literature, especially within the Anglophone tradition, has been that literature
is useful in different ways than overtly political writing. The most hyperbolic
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expression of this is the famous concluding sentence of Percy Bysshe Shelley’s
A Defence of Poetry: “Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.”1
The fact that Archambeau equates aesthetic autonomy and uselessness
means that the latter is largely repressed in this book, but it also means that it
haunts the discussion of aesthetic autonomy in quite an uncanny way. I have
said that the word “uselessness” does not appear in the book. However, the
word “useless” does, on two (or let us say one-and-a-half) occasions. On the
first of these, Archambeau writes of Coleridge: “He was certainly haunted by a
sense that he was a mere imposter, a useless and weak outsider passing through
a world properly belonging to people more confident, grounded, and socially
integrated than himself ” (34). Archambeau’s approach in this book, inspired by
Pierre Bourdieu, is to look at the ways in which the personal circumstances and
psychologies of the poets studied intersected with ideas of aesthetic autonomy in
their literary contexts to produce their unique bodies of work. A key aspect of
this intersection for many of the poets is that it was their sense of displacement
which led them to embrace an autonomous literary aesthetic. Thus, for instance,
Eliot had to confront the loss of social status and cultural influence of the Boston
Brahmin class to which he belonged; Stein had a strong sense of homelessness;
and Ashbery experienced “three kinds of alienation—having to do with his
sexuality, his relation to conventionally productive labor, and his status as a
certain kind of poet in midcentury America” (201). Though it is only Coleridge
whom Archambeau describes as feeling “useless,” we might reasonably take him
to suggest that these other poets also felt this way; after all, the culture to which
they all belong is one which finds worth only in utility, and to be alienated from
society is to be marked as useless.
Archambeau probably sees the idea of the autonomous poem as a correlative
of the uselessness of the poet, but, by reopening the gap between uselessness and
aesthetic autonomy, might we not instead see the latter as a kind of sublimation
of the former, whereby feelings of uselessness (both individual and collective) are
transformed into an eminently useful commitment to poetry? The book begins
by demonstrating that the notion of aesthetic autonomy can be traced back to the
eighteenth-century English philosopher Shaftesbury’s philosophy of proper taste.
For Shaftesbury, those who had taste were thereby placed at a remove from society
and, for that very reason, able to guide it. This idea of a powerful cultured elite was
developed further by Coleridge in his concept of the “clerisy,” which had a strong
influence on Arnold, and created the context in which Tennyson was torn between
the roles of aesthete and “public moralist” (47). The late nineteenth century marked
a turn from what Archambeau nicely terms “a cultured minority to a minority
culture” (76), in which the idea of aesthetic autonomy served to create a sense
of belonging and community within an artistic coterie, and all the later poets
whom Archambeau looks at grappled in different ways with this context.
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The first of these later poets considered by Archambeau is Yeats; Archambeau
argues that Yeats sought, though ultimately failed, to unify aesthetic autonomy
with a social role for poetry in a public form of art which could give expression
to a true Irish nationalist spirit; more specifically, he dreamt that the Order of
Celtic Mysteries could give “the arts a home in the world” (102). In this history
of the idea of aesthetic autonomy, uselessness is indeed repressed, but if we see
it as precisely that—the occluded, unconscious origin of the (as Archambeau
amply demonstrates) highly useful idea of aesthetic autonomy—we might
then be attentive to the ways in which it necessarily and insistently returns
in unpredictable forms to undercut the historical narrative. Examples of this
could include Coleridge’s fixation on failure, Tennyson’s enduring grief for his
friend Arthur Hallam, Yeats’s unrequited love for Maud Gonne, and Eliot’s
depression, which contributed to his most famous, and perhaps most useless,
poem, The Waste Land (1922).
The second occurrence of the word “useless” in Poetry and Uselessness is not
the word itself (hence the half), but its French equivalent, “inutile,” which has,
according to the Oxford English Dictionary, been adopted into English, and come
back into use recently after a period of obsolescence. It appears in the course of
Archambeau’s discussion of the passage of Auden’s poem “In Memory of W.B.
Yeats” (1939) in which occurs the phrase “poetry makes nothing happen” (quoted,
197). This is a phrase which serves as something of a leitmotif in Archambeau’s
book: “for Auden [. . .] there is some comfort in this notion of poetry as a kind
of timeless, aesthetic, inutile thing” (197). The use of the French here is entirely
necessary, because “useless” simply does not belong with “timeless” and “aesthetic.”
When we hear that English word, we think first of all, not of timeless jewels, but
of that which is without worth, if not immediately of refuse and waste. The kinds
of abject emotions I have just alluded to would be embraced by this word, rather
than taste, discernment, and a love of the beautiful. The fact that the French
word “inutile” can be associated with the aesthetic is owing to the fact that, as
Archambeau says, the connection between “aesthetic autonomy and a minority
literary culture” was imported from France in the late nineteenth century into
the English-speaking world, as Aestheticism (78). In using the French word
instead of the English, this whole culture of French Aestheticism (or, more
accurately, what it is made to stand for in the English tradition) takes the place,
and thereby represses, the everyday connotations of the word “useless.”
If one of these connotations is the abject, a second is purposeless play, and
this is another form in which the insistent recurrence of uselessness can be
traced through Poetry and Uselessness, most notably in the three poets whom
Archambeau identifies as most strongly advocating aesthetic autonomy: Auden,
Stein, and Ashbery. In the case of Auden, Archambeau finds a “deeper unity”
between his claims for the aesthetic autonomy of poetry, and the political
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content of much of his poetry, in “camp,” which he defines as “a kind of ludic and
aestheticizing attitude” (163). In this light, Auden is read as a “camp dogmatist”
(169), mistaken for a guru, who pokes fun at ideas which, unlike a satirist, he
has some affection for, and Archambeau demonstrates that it was precisely the
distance afforded by a camp attitude that gave Auden’s poetry political efficacy
in the ideologically-riven 1930s. In camp, therefore, uselessness and usefulness
would seem to hang together in a non-binary kind of a way.
The chapter on Stein is, for me, the least satisfactory in the book, precisely
because Archambeau doesn’t attend to the role of play in her work. He takes her
claims of genius entirely seriously as an expression of a monstrous narcissism,
without considering the possibility that she might be playing (or right), and he
reads in her poetry a displaced expression of her lesbianism (though it doesn’t
seem all that displaced to me). Archambeau thus finds in psychological and
social determinants the reasons why “[Stein’s] writing represents an impulse
to aesthetic autonomy both purer and more radical than that of any other
writer of similar stature and consequence” (109), but I would have liked to
have seen a greater consideration of one of the things which makes that writing
so radical, namely the free play of the signifier. Free play is certainly suggested
in Archambeau’s characterization of Ashbery’s work as “a poetics of drift”
(201), and I get the impression that Ashbery would be the most likely of any of
the poets considered in this book to advocate a poetics of uselessness, for, we
are told, when an interviewer “tells Ashbery he thinks Ashbery’s poetry gives
us ‘language as a child would use it, language before it becomes useful’ [. . .]
Ashbery interjects ‘yeah! yeah!’ enthusiastically” (204). This enthusiasm for the
playful uselessness of language would be in line with Ashbery’s alienation from
“conventionally productive labor,” and when Archambeau says that his “antidogmatic stance [. . .] extends even to the aestheticism to which he is drawn”
(202), I would conjecture that this is because for Ashbery, as for me, aesthetic
autonomy and uselessness are not synonymous.
Not so much in the margins of this book, then, as somewhere beneath its
surface, haunting it like an uncanny double and occasionally breaking through,
most dramatically in its very title, we can indeed find the spectral presence
of a book on poetry and uselessness. Perhaps this is the only way in which
we can possibly approach a spirit of uselessness within a utilitarian culture
in which uselessness, by definition, can have no home. Nonetheless, I would
still like someone to write about the subject more directly. The title Poetry and
Uselessness has, unfortunately, already been taken, so how about Uselessness and
Poetry, though I know that’s not the same thing at all. I’d be happy to review it.
1
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